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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
SCOPE OF ADni sTR

irVE DiSCRETION To GRANT OR DENY LICENSES

The State Liquor Authority and its subordinate local boards were created
by the Alcoholic Beverage and Control Law to regulate and control traffic in
alcoholic beverages through a licensing system. The broad standard of "public
convenience and advantage"'. set forth in the authorizing law has been generally
recognized by the courts as empowering the Liquor Authority with wide discretion in formulating its rules and policy.
In Gross v. New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Board,2 the courts
demonstrate that this discretion, however broad, can be the subject of abuse.
The plaintiff there applied for a change in classification for his restaurant
from a beer and wine license to a liquor license. His application to the defendant board was refused because he had neither requested nor received a waiver
from the Liquor Authority on its thirteen month moratorium on the acceptance of applications for restaurant licenses. This restriction was set forth in
Rule 453 promulgated by the Liquor Authority to limit the number of onpremises licenses pending completion of a survey of needs.
The plaintiff brought this proceeding under Civil Practice Act article 78
alleging that the refusal to accept his license application under the waiver provision of Rule 45 effectively denied him the right to a court review of the
Authority's decision, as specifically provided in Section 1214 of the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Law.
The dismissal of plaintiff's petition at Special Term was reversed by the
Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals affirmed the reversal in a four to
three decision marked by a vigorous dissent.
The Court, in striking down Rule 45, condemned it as illusory in that
its actual effect was far more sweeping than any purpose that might be suggested by a casual perusal of its terms.
1. N.Y. Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 2.
2. 7 N.Y.2d 531, 200 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1960).
3. The relevant portion of Rule 45 provides:
. . on and after February 1st, 1959 and pending the completion of the aforesaid survey and study and determination thereon, the number of annual restaurant liquor or wine licenses shall be limited to the number in effect throughout
the State after allapplications for such licenses filed prior to February 1st, 1959
or filed as the result of the next succeeding paragraph have been acted upon, and
further . . .
. . . that during the period February 1st, 1959 through January 31st, 1960, no
application for any of the aforesaid licensed (whether by way of an original
application or by way of a change in class) shall -be accepted by any Local
Board or Zone Office of the Liquor Authority except that any person may be
granted a waiver of the foregoing limitation provided that he shall establish by
proof satisfactory to the State Liquor Authority compliance with . . . [certain
specified] conditions."
4. This section specifically provided for judicial review in those instances where the
Authority either denied, issued or revoked a license.
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The Liquor Authority claimed that the rule must be sustained as being
within the powers set forth in sections of the authorizing statute, particularly
Section 17 which makes limitation of licenses discretionary and allows a prohibition of the acceptance of applications for a class of licenses that has been
limited.5 It likens Rule 45 to Rule 17 which was upheld by the Court in
Brenner v. O'Connell.6
The majority opinion admitted that Section 17 allowed a moratorium on
the issuance of license and acceptance of applications to be declared but insisted that Rule 45 differed sharply from Rule 17 in the case cited in that,
the latter rule provided for an absolute limitation. The instant rule while
similarly providing a cut off date after which no application will be accepted
for the given class of licenses proceeds to open the door a crack by adding a
waiver clause. This, the Court maintains, allows the Liquor Authority to disregard at will its own declared limitation. The effect was to replace the lawfulness of an absolute bar on applications with an unlawful or unauthorized
method for the issuance of licenses. It circumvents, said the Court, the elaborate
procedure provided by the Legislature in Sections 64, 55 and 54 as well as
the right to review in Section 121 of the Control Law. According to the Court,
Sections 64 and 55 are identical in that each allows that "any person may make
an application" and each incorporates the relevant controlling procedure of
Section 54.7 They differ only in that Section 55 relates to beer whereas Section
64 relates to liquor.
Since no section mentions or provides for a waiver procedure, the Court
held that Rule 45 erected a new and unauthorized procedure for granting
licenses and was in excess of statutory authority. It deprived the applicant of
substantial rights to review at the administrative level as well as by the courts
because of the silence of the provisions in Sections 54 and 121 as to any recourse available upon a refusal to grant a waiver.
The dissenting opinion lashed out at the holding, calling it an impeachment
of a high administrative body and stating that it strikes at the very heart of
5. Supra note 1, § 17(2) gives the Authority the power:
... To limit in its discretion the number of licenses of each class to be issued within
the state or any political subdivision thereof and in connection therewith to prohibit the acceptance. of applications for such class or classes of licenses which
have been so limited.
6. 308 N.Y. 636, 127 NXE.2d 715 (1955).
7. Supra note 1, § 64(1):
Any person may make an application to the appropriate board for a license
to sell liquor at retail to be consumed on the premises where sold.

§ 64(3):
Section fifty-four shall control so far as applicable the procedure in connection
with such application.
§ 55(1):

Any person may make an application ...
for a license to sell beer at retail to
be consumed upon the premises.
: . . All of the provisions contained in subdivision two and three of the preceding section (54) shall apply to the procedure relative to an application for a
license under this section.
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the legislative policy of directing the Liquor Authority to determine how public
convenience and advantage will be best promoted.
The minority rejects the contention that Rule 45 is ultra vires as to the
powers given by the statute. The opinion leaves no doubt but that it views
the holding inconsistent with the prior upholding of Rule 17 in the Brenner
case. It maintained that Rule 17 and Rule 45 are essentially the same. The
waiver could be justified on the grounds that the very nature of an eating place
requires a greater flexibility in meeting the necessities of public convenience
and advantage than does a liquor license for off-premise consumption as in
Rule 17. The waiver provision, it insists, is not a gross usurpation of legislative
authority but rather is merely an aid to expeditious and efficient administration.
No numerical limitation on a class of licenses or applications is required
if such rigidity impedes the Liquor Authority in carrying forward its statutory
mandate, according to the minority opinion. It also suggested that the Court's
confusion resulted from its comparing of Section 55 to Section 64. Section 55,
said the dissent, merely provides the standard for judging a bona-fide restaurants while Section 64 refers to off-premises liquor consumption and not
to a restaurant liquor license.
The logical inference to be drawn from these arguments is that the procedure of Section 54 does not necessarily apply to restaurant liquor licenses
to the extent it does to a license for off-premise consumption of liquor. To
hold otherwise said the minority would be to ignore the compelling problems
which the Legislature intended the Liquor Authority to solve. In any event the
Authority has the ultimate say in whether or not a license shall issue.
Finally, the dissent convincingly argued that if denial of a waiver was
a denial of a license as the majority opinion suggested, then it must follow
that judicial review is available under Section 121 and not cut off by any
unauthorized procedure.

A discretionary power that is exercised by an administrative official must
be delegated to him by statute. The statute must also contain guides or
standards in the use of this discretion in order to insure that the administrator
carries out the intent of the Legislature. However, in the case of licensing
officials these requirements of the delegation of discretion and guides in its
exercise may be implied where the granting of the license would result in a
thwarting of public policy which the licensing statute is evidently, either from
its history or from its face, designed to implement.9
The Administrative Code of the City of New York provides for the
8. Supra note 1, § 55(3).
9. Rosenberg v. Moss, 296 N.Y. 595, 68 N.E.2d 880 (1946); Schwab v. Grant, 126
N.Y. 473, 27 N.E. 964 (1891); Arroyo v. Moss, 269 App. Div. 824, 56 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1st
Dep't 1945), aff'd 295 N.Y. 754, 65 N.E.2d 750 (1946).
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licensing of public carts.' 0 The petitioner in Barton Trucking Corp. v. O'Connell" made application for such a public cart license in order to carry on its
business in the garment industry. The Commissioner refused the license because the petitioner Corporation's treasurer had been convicted, some twenty
years before, of extortion in connection with the same garment industry. The
Commissioner took the position that in refusing the license he acted in good
faith for the safety and welfare of the general public and that the nature of the
crime of which petitioner's treasurer was convicted was sufficient reason to
deny the license. The Supreme Court denied a petition to annul the order and
the Appellate Division reversed and remanded to the Commissioner on the
ground that the twenty year old conviction did not show a present unfitness
in petitioner.
The Court of Appeals in a 4 to 3 decision upheld the Commissioner on
the ground that this twenty year old crime showed a sufficient possible detriment to the public welfare. The Court held that the purpose of the statute
was not simply to raise revenue (the fees barely meeting administrative costs)
but to act as a control in an industry in which there had been found a great
deal of corruption. The Court reasoned that the Commissioner need not act
as a mere automaton, but had implied discretion in issuing licenses where the
purpose of the licensing statute is not merely revenue raising but control for
the public welfare. The Commissioner's refusal, based on the twenty year
old conviction, was not an abuse of discretion because of the nature of the
crime and because of the particular industry involved.
There is a line of cases in New York to the effect that a licensing official
may not use this implied discretion to refuse a license for reasons other than
that the granting of such license would violate some other law or regulation
having the force of a law. In one case, 12 heavily relied upon by petitioner in
his brief, the Court held that the Commissioner may not refuse a license even
for the protection of the public if he has not been delegated standards by the
Legislature. However, it is to be noted that in these cases the statute in
question was not immediately related; either in its purpose or history, to the
10. Administrative Code of the City of New York, ch. 32, Art. 15, §§ B32-93.0 to
B32-96.0.
§ B32-92.0 defines a public cart as . . . every vehicle, either horse drawn or motor
driven, which is kept for hire or used to carry merchandise ... within the city, for pay.
§ B32-96.0 regulates the rates to be charged by public cartmen and the number of
persons to be employed on a particular hauling job.
§ B32-95.0 . . . the Commissioner shall issue a license to the owner of the public
cart together with the plate upon payment of the license fee.
11. 7 N.Y.2d 299, 197 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1959).
12. Small v. Moss, 279 N.Y. 288, 18 N.E2d 281 (1938).
The Commissioner of Services of New York City refused a theatre license on the
ground that its location would present a "traffic condition that would be dangerous to
the traveling public." The Court held that, absent delegated standards, the Commissioner
has no implied power to refuse a license except where it would violate another ordinance
or regulation which has the force of a law. In this case the evil sought to be prevented was not directly related to the purpose of the statute.
See also Dr. Bloom Dentist, Inc. v. Cruise, 259 N.Y. 358, 182 N.E. 16 (1932).
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supposed evil sought to be prevented by the Commissioner. In this respect
these cases are distinguishable from the holding in the present case.
The holding in the present case would appear to be as far as the courts
of this state will go in ratifying an exercise of implied discretion of an administrative official. Perhaps a better solution to the problem would be for the
Legislature to explicitly confer on the licensing official discretion to refuse a
license for unfit moral character, together with standards to be used in its
application, rather than allow the licensing official to supply "legislative omissions" in individual cases.
In Swalbaclk v. Siatm Liquor Authority,13 an action was brought under the
Civil Practice Act, Section 1283"et seq. to annul the determination of the State
Liquor Authority, disapproving the application of petitioner to remove his
package liquor store from the City of Rochester to an area near a shopping
center in the suburban Town of Henrietta. This removal was caused by the
State Highway Department's acquisition of petitioner's former premises in
conjunction with the construction of a state highway.
The Supreme Court, Special Term, rendered an order annulling the
determination of the State Liquor Authority and the State Liquor Authority
appealed. The Appellate Division' 4 reversed the order of the Special Term
and petitioner appealed. The Court of Appeals (4-3) reversed the order of
the Appellate Division, annulled the determination of the State Liquor Authority and remitted the matter to the Authority for further proceedings.
The State Liquor Authority placed its decision upon the grounds that
to locate the store in such close proximity to a large shopping center would
be contrary to the policy' 5 of prohibiting the location of retail wine and liquor
stores in a modem shopping center and would be disruptive of the statutory
plan for the location of liquor stores in neighborhoods so as best to serve public
convenience and advantage.
The Legislature has made it clear that the Liquor Authority shall "determine whether public convenience and advantage will be promoted by the
issuance of licenses . . . and the lo6ation of premises licensed thereby, subject
only to the right of judicial review."' 16 Section 101-c of the Alcoholic Beverage
Control Law was added in 1950. That Section provides for the imposition of
minimum consumer prices and contains the language relied on by the Liquor
Authority as one of the principle supports for its policy expressed in the above
mentioned Bulletin. It reads in part, "to eliminate price wars which unduly
stimulate the sale and consumption of liquor and wine, disrupt the orderly
sale and distribution thereof and tend to destroy the statutory plan for the
13.
14.
15.
16.

7 N.Y.2d 518, 200 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1960).
7 A.D.2d 883, 181 N.Y.S.2d 290 (4th Dep't 1950).
Expressed in State Liquor Authority Bulletin No. 279, Dec. 9, 1955.
N.Y. Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 2.
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location of off-premises liquor and wine stores in neighborhood communities
which most effectively serve public convenience and advantage." 1
Elsewhere in the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law and Legislature has
specifically sanctioned the location of liquor stores in other than neighborhood
communities.' s As the majority pointed out, these specified locations attract
considerable trade which would otherwise be transacted locally.
The policy of the State Liquor Authority of prohibiting liquor stores in
shopping centers has been the subject of judicial review in the past and has
received the sanction of the lower courts of this state.' 9
The majority strongly disapproved of the general policy to exclude liquor
stores from every shopping center as unreasonable and unsupportable. The
dissent held that although reliance on this general policy, per se, in no way
establishes arbitrary action, its application is always subject to review.
Courts will not disturb the exercise of administrative discretion vested in
the State Liquor Authority unless the action complained of is deemed arbitrary
and unreasonable.20 However the courts have by no means abdicated their
judicial responsibility to review and pass upon administrative actions claimed
to be arbitrary and without support in fact or law. A finding of an administrative agency "is supported by the evidence only when the evidence is so substantial that from it an inference of the existence of the fact found may be
2

reasonably drawn."1 '

The authority's attack on petitioner's proposed site is premised on the
idea that public convenience and advantage would not thereby be promoted.
It is difficult to comprehend this argument, when the mushrooming growth
of shopping centers is accounted for by the fact that the public finds them
both more convenient and advantageous. It seems that in a growing suburban
community such as the Town in question, the concept, "neighborhood," connotes a different idea than it did ten years ago. It is not improbable that with
our suburban areas zoned and restricted so as to keep business establishments
in confined areas, that a liquor store contained in a shopping center does fit
into the legislative concept of neighborhood distribution even though these
establishments incidentally may draw from a larger area.
These proposals although perhaps not universally true do point up the
fact strongly contended for by the majority, that a general policy which excludes liquor stores from every shopping center is unreasonable and unsupportable. It further indicates that the Authority must deal with the situations
case by case, appraising the facts as each application is submitted.
If the facts on which the Authority based its denial of petitioner's applica17. Id. § 101(c).
18. N.Y. Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 105(2).
19. Green v. Rohan, 3 Misc. 2d 680, 159 N.Y.S.2d 119 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Deitch v.
Rohan, 3 Misc. 2d 458, 152 N.YS..2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
20. Fiore v. O'Connell, 297 N.Y. 260, 78 N.E.2d 602 (1948).
21. Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256, 26 N.E.2d 247 (1940).
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tion for a license bears no reasonable relation to the policy to be enforced,
its determination is to be annulled and the license should be granted. 2The New York City Charter grants general licensing power to the Commissioner of Licenses except for licensing power conferred by law on any other
person.2
The Administrative Code of the City of New York requires junk dealers
to be licensed, bonded, and prescribes procedures and restrictions designed to
reduce the availability of a market for stolen property. 24
In In re Bologno v. O'ConnelZ25 the Commissioner of Licenses refused to
issue a license to petitioner solely on the ground that the operation of a junk
yard might be harmful to the neighborhood even though it was an unrestricted
use area. The Supreme Court granted an application by the petitioner for an
order directing the Commissioner to issue a license. The Appellate Division
unanimously affirmed the order.2 6 The Court of Appeals also affirmed, with
two judges dissenting.
The majority opinion in the Court of Appeals took the position that although the Legislature has the power to impose regulations concerning the
location of junk businesses as well as the character of the people who operate
them, only authority of the latter type was delegated to the Commissioner of
Licenses. This approach is consistent with the Administrative Code which
specifically grants the following authority to the Planning Commission...
For each such district, regulations may be imposed designating the
trades and industries that shall be excluded or subjected to special
regulations and designating the uses for which buildings may not be
erected or altered. Such regulations shall be designed to promote the
public health, safety, and general welfare. The commissioner shall
give reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of
the district, its peculiar suitability for particular uses, the conservation
of property values, and the direction
of building development in ac27
cord with a well considered plan.
The Court reasoned that the Planning Commission, which is delegated,
pursuant to the above statute, the authority and responsibility for zoning
regulations concerning trades and industry is, the only authority to deny location to an industry on the grounds that its presence could be detrimental to,
and out of harmony with a certain area. The Court concluded from this
premise that if considerations solely germane to zoning regulations were the
only ones used by the Licensing Commissioner to deny the instant petitioner
22.
1950).

Baird v. State Liquor Authority, 277 App. Div. 60, 98 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1st Dep't

23.

§ 773.

24.
25.
26.
27.

Ch. 32, art. 18, §§ B32-113.O-B32-124.0.
7 N.Y.2d 155, 196 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1959).
7 A.D.2d 749, 181 N.Y.S.2d 765 (2d Dep't 1958).
Administrative Code of the City of New York § 200-2.0.
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his license, then such denial was arbitrary. It was arbitrary because an administrator must base his decisions upon a delegation of authority received
from the Legislature and such delegation of authority must contain a standard,
either express or implied, that will guide the administrator in the exercise of
such authority. This standard must be sufficiently definite to overcome any
objectives that the Legislature is abdicating its legislative function and then
violating the constitutional separation of powers. The majority opinion in the
instant case decides that the standard which the Administrative Code granted
to the Commissioner of Licenses was to either grant or deny a license to a
junk dealer according to his character as relating to his susceptibility to deal in
stolen property. It follows that if he uses any other standard than this (that
ipso facto) he exceeds his authority, and no matter how reasonable the standard
is which the Commissioner uses, if it is not the standard that the Legislature
provided him with, then his action is arbitrary.
The majority was strongly influenced by the consideration that to allow
the Commissioner of Licenses to determine what industries would tend to harm
an area, that had been zoned an unrestricted use area, would overlap with the
function of the Commissioner of Planning. They refused to indulge in the
heresy that the Legislature would grant conflicting and overlapping jurisdiction.
One of the main cases relied on by the dissent was Rosenberg v. Moss28
which was affirmed by the Appellate Division, 3 to 2, no opinion and affirmed
by the Court of Appeals 5 justices for and 2 justices taking no part, with no
opinion. In that case the trial judge stated, that the location of the premises
as well as the character of the applicant are relevant factors in determining
whether the grant of a license might impair the public health, safety or morals
of the community. So too the suitability of the premises involved may be of
prime importance. All these matters and many more must enter into the
consideration. Since there is no appellate opinion in the Rosenberg case
and the contention of the petitioner in that case was that the Commissioner
had no discretion to look at things other than his citizenship and his willingness to pay the statutory licensing fee it is improbable that it could be controlling in the instant case.2 9 Another argument advanced by the dissent was
the curious statement, "If the zoning map and the certificate of occupancy
from another city department established petitioner's rights to run a junk yard
business at this location, there would be no point to having a separate junk
yard licensing law." This'statement is odd because the Court of Appeals specifically stated in People v. American Wool Stock Corp.,3 0 ". . . its purpose and
28. N.YL.J., Aug. 14, 1941, p. 343, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd 266 App. Div.
845, 43 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1st Dep't 1943), aff'd 296 N.Y. 595, 68 N.E.2d 880 (1946).
29. The Rosenberg case involved the denial of a bowling alley license by the Commissioner on the ground that its operation might be harmful to the neighborhood and the
morals of the local children. That case also involved the construction of a different
statute with different objectives. See Administrative Code, ch. 32, tit. B, art. 7, § B32-46.0.
30. 286 N.Y. 77, 81, 35 N.E.2d 905, 909 (1941).
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effect is to control a business which provides a market for stolen property."
This control is achieved by granting licenses to individuals who are not likely
to receive stolen property and refusing to grant licenses to those people that
the commissioner decides are prone to acting as receivers of stolen property.
It seems clear that the majority opinion is more likely to secure effective
and harmonious business regulation by vesting the power to regulate different
aspects of trade in those agencies that are best qualified to handle them. The
Commissioner of Licenses may have been well meaning in his refusal to issue
a license in order to protect the neighborhood, however he would have been
powerless to protect the same area from a glue factory or a slaughterhouse
because they do not require a license. It follows that the holding of Picone v.
Commissioner of Licenses is applicable, "As the commissioner does not deny
that petitioner is a fit and proper person to operate a junk (boat), it follows
that his action in refusing to grant a license to the appellant was, however well
intentioned, in a legal sense an abuse of his decretion."'1
CERTAIN SiTuATioNs REQuIE AGENCIES To GRANT
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The State Residential Rent Law 2 was amended in 195733 to make it
mandatory for the Rent Administrator to use a sales price as the valuation
base in a rent adjustment proceeding, when certain conditions exist.3 4 The
conditions are: (1) The sale must be bona fide and within the period from
March 15, 1953 to the time of filing the application; (2) The transaction must
be at arm's length, on normal financing terms at a readily ascertainable price;
(3) It must be unaffected by special circumstances such as forced sale, exchange of property, package deal, work sale, or sale to a cooperative.-a In
Realty Agency, Inc. v. Weaver,36 the Court of Appeals considered a case where
a petition asking that the sales price be used as opposed to assessed valuation
was denied by the Rent Administrator based upon his determination that the
sale in question was not an "arm's length" transaction and was affected by
special circumstances. The facts show that the stockholders of petitioner's
principal held a 35 per cent interest in the operating profits and proceeds of
sale of the property purchased. It is upon this ground, after the normal routine
investigation, no hearing being granted to the petitioner, that the Administrator denied the petition for rent increase sufficient to allow a 6 per cent net
annual return on the basis of the purchase price. The Court reversed the decision of the Appellate Division 1 which upheld the Rent Administrator's action.
The Court decided that on the face of the record there was no substantial evidence to support the Administrator's finding that the consumated bargain was
31.

241 N.Y. 157, 162, 149 N.E. 336, 341 (1925).

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1946 ch. 274 et seq.
N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1957 ch. 755, § 4(4) (a) (1).
Ackerman v. Weaver, 6 N.Y.2d 283, 189 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1959).
Supra note7 33.
7 N.Y.2d 249, 196 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1959).
8 A.D.2d 773, 186 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1st Dep't 1959).

